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Population based researchRecord linkage typically involves the use of dedicated linkage units who are supplied with personally
identifying information to determine individuals from within and across datasets. The personally identi-
fying information supplied to linkage units is separated from clinical information prior to release by data
custodians. While this substantially reduces the risk of disclosure of sensitive information, some residual
risks still exist and remain a concern for some custodians. In this paper we trial a method of record link-
age which reduces privacy risk still further on large real world administrative data. The method uses
encrypted personal identifying information (bloom ﬁlters) in a probability-based linkage framework.
The privacy preserving linkage method was tested on ten years of New South Wales (NSW) and Western
Australian (WA) hospital admissions data, comprising in total over 26 million records. No difference in
linkage quality was found when the results were compared to traditional probabilistic methods using full
unencrypted personal identiﬁers. This presents as a possible means of reducing privacy risks related to
record linkage in population level research studies. It is hoped that through adaptations of this method
or similar privacy preserving methods, risks related to information disclosure can be reduced so that the
beneﬁts of linked research taking place can be fully realised.
 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
1.1. Administrative data as resource
Administrative health records, containing information on an
individual’s health and the health services they have received, cov-
er a large proportion of the population and are generally consid-
ered to be highly sensitive data. They are used not only for
managing an individual health event, but have important uses in
informing research, planning and decision making [1]. Current
Australian laws provide a number of safeguards to personal privacy
including the requirement that the public beneﬁt in using health
information for research outweighs with the privacy risks of doing
so for the individual [2].1.2. Record linkage of health information
The process of record linkage is often used to enable researchers
to answer questions which require a picture of an individual’s
health over time. Record linkage is used to identify administrative
records belonging to the same person from multiple datasets. In
the absence of a unique person identiﬁer, this task is typicallycarried out using personally identifying information such as name,
date of birth and address. As these identiﬁers can change and/or in-
clude errors within or between datasets, probabilistic statistical
methods are typically used to ensure high quality links [3]. This
linkage process allows researchers to answer questions about the
health of individuals over time rather than solely about discrete
health events. Research using linked data has resulted in changes
to health services delivery and policy [4]. Large scale investment
in record linkage infrastructure has occurred in England [5], Scot-
land [6], Wales [7], Canada [8] and Australia [9] over the last thirty
years. Each of these centres has developed linkage expertise which
has enabled important research at a population level.
1.3. Record linkage processes and privacy protection
The linkage of different administrative collections across portfo-
lios usually requires the transfer of data to a trusted party or ‘link-
age unit’, which may or may not be external to the data custodians/
owners. Various processes and protocols have been developed to
protect the privacy of individual and to maintain the security of
data.
1.3.1. Separation principle
One method used in many Australian linkage units to reduce
privacy risks is to separate data [10]. Under this model, the data
is split into personally identifying data (containing information
such as name, address and date of birth) and content data (clinical
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are released to a linkage unit, whose sole role is to determine
which records belong to a single person (the release of name-iden-
tifying information for research is typically permitted in Australia
through exemptions in privacy laws). This is carried out through
probabilistic linkage using personal identiﬁers, typically with a
large manual review component. The linkage unit then sends this
information back to the custodian, who uses it to supply clinical
information to the researcher (see Figure 1).
This method is used by linkage units in WA and NSW to conduct
state-based linkages, and has been adopted by the CDL as its best
practice national linkage model [9].
1.3.2. Information governance
In addition to the separation principle, linkage units have
adopted strong policies and procedures applying to the obtaining,
handling, using and disclosing of personally identifying informa-
tion. This includes an effort to ensure that staff understand their
role and responsibilities, that information assets are protected, that
policies exist surrounding breaches and disclosure and that infor-
mation systems place a high priority on security in their design.
These policies and procedures have been adopted and developed
with input from data custodians.
1.4. Privacy preserving linkage techniques
By separating clinical data from personal identiﬁers during the
linkage process, the risk of revealing sensitive information about
individuals is dramatically reduced. Staff conducting the linkage
have access only to identifying information, while researchers
see only the clinical information relevant for their research ques-
tions. Appropriate information governance within linkage units
further reduces the risk of information leaks, whether accidentally
or maliciously by operators, or as a result of poor business
processes.
Nevertheless, some residual risk to privacy remains and, for
some data custodians, this is sufﬁcient to prevent the release of
personally identifying information to record linkage units. Ideally,
such data custodians seek a zero-risk method of providing accurate
linked research data without the need to disclose any identifying
information to linkage units.
Various techniques known as privacy preserving linkage have
been developed to provide lower risk solutions for record linkage.
These methods engage in record linkage on encrypted information,
and do not require third parties to see personal identiﬁers. These
techniques each differ in their methods, maturity, practicality
and suitability for large scale linkages (particularly of low quality
data).
Privacy preserving techniques can be classiﬁed into two general
categories – those that utilise a third party for performing the link-
age (three party protocols) and those that do not (two party proto-
cols). Two-party protocols often require a greater amount of
necessary communication and computation [11] to compare re-
cords, but can be considered more secure as they do not rely on
the existence of a trusted third party [12].
In terms of security, privacy preserving techniques generally
adopt the same threat model, but differ in the particular privacy
techniques used. Nearly all privacy preserving protocols adopt an
‘honest-but-curious’ threat model [12], whereby parties are ex-
pected to try to carry out the protocol correctly, but will also try
and ﬁnd out as much information as they can from any data they
receive.
Perhaps the most important criteria in differentiating privacy
preserving protocols are around performance features such as link-
age quality, scalability and robustness. Privacy preserving proto-
cols range in terms of the comparison techniques applied, fromthose carrying out an exact match on entire records, to protocols
employing string similarity measures on individual ﬁelds. Those
protocols utilising more ﬁne-grained techniques in determining
similarity will typically give higher linkage quality.
Several privacy preserving protocols are being regularly used
for routine record linkage. The Australian Institute of Health and
Welfare uses the 2nd, 3rd and 5th letters of surname, the 2nd
and 3rd letters of forename, the full date of birth and the persons
sex to create a ‘statistical linkage key’ (SLK) which is used to match
records [13]. The SLK has been used successfully for a large number
of linkages. The Swiss Anonymous Linkage Code [14] creates an
identiﬁer from the phonetic codes of ﬁrst and last name, along with
full date of birth and sex. A similar method has been used to con-
duct linkage in France [15]. Grhanite [16] also uses privacy pre-
serving protocols; like some other systems, it applies a number
of pre-processing steps, including phonetic encoding and nick-
name resolution, before creating their identiﬁer. The process uses
these pre-processing steps and fuzzy matching algorithms to pro-
duce linkage results that are probabilistic in nature.
In this paper we adopted the bloom ﬁlter method for privacy
preserving record linkage, developed by Schnell et al. [11]. There
were several reasons why we chose this method over other privacy
preserving protocols. Firstly the bloom ﬁlter approach differs from
most other privacy preserving linkage methods in that it is able to
measure the similarity between two ﬁelds (for instance, between
two names) – a method often used in probabilistic record linkage
to ensure high quality. Evaluations of privacy preserving string
comparison using bloom ﬁlters have demonstrated very high qual-
ity [11,17], including quality improvements over the SLK and the
Swiss anonymous linkage code [18]. Current evaluations have fo-
cussed on small data samples, but the method appears adaptable
for large-scale record linkage. The method appears robust and
well-developed, with a number of papers investigating its security
[19] and proposing additions to its method [18,20].
The use of bloom ﬁlters was evaluated to determine its suitabil-
ity for conducting large scale privacy preserving record linkage.
Two datasets, comprising in total over 26 million records, were
linked using this method, with results compared to the linkage of
unencrypted data. A probabilistic linkage framework was adopted
to allow large-scale linkage to occur.2. Method
2.1. Application of bloom ﬁlters
To use bloom ﬁlters for encrypted record linkage, the personal
identiﬁers need to be encrypted by data custodians. As this process
is technically complicated, data custodians would need to be sup-
plied with software that would enable them to encrypt the records.
The data custodians involved in the project would agree on a pass-
word or pass phrase used to encrypt the data, which would not be
shared with the linkage unit. The encrypted data can then be
passed to the linkage unit, who can use it to determine which
records belong to the same person (see Figure 2).2.1.1. Creating and comparing bloom ﬁlters
An outline of the encryption process presented by Schnell et al.
[11] is shown in Fig. 3 along with the method for comparing two
encrypted variables which is shown in Fig. 4. Each value (for
instance the given name ‘SEAN’ on one record) is encrypted
separately.
A bloom ﬁlter begins as an array of a set length, with all array
elements set to zero. Firstly, bigrams (overlapping sets of two let-
ters) of the matching variables are created. Padding has been used
to give the ﬁrst and last letters their own bigrams – for instance,
Fig. 1. The separation principle: Personally identifying information (name, address,
date of birth) is sent only to the linkage unit, while clinical information is sent only
to the researcher.
Fig. 2. Privacy preserving linkage using bloom ﬁlters: personal identiﬁers are ﬁrst
encrypted by the data custodian before being sent to the linkage unit.
Fig. 3. Example of encoding the name ‘Sean’ into a Bloom Filter of length 20.
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bigrams ‘_S’, ‘SE’, ‘EA’, ‘AN’ ‘N_’.
Each of the bigrams is passed through a hash function. The hash
function is an algorithmwhich produces a ﬁxed length output with
several important properties. Firstly, given the same input, it will
always produce the same output (i.e. the same bigram will always
produce the same hash value). The hash functions is also one-way,
meaning it is not possible to determine the encoded bigram from
the given hash value.
The modulus of these hashes is then computed with respect to
the length of the bloom ﬁlter. This results in each bigram having a
number which corresponds to a position in the bloom ﬁlter. These
positions in the bloom ﬁlter are then changed to 1. When all re-
quired bigrams are added in this way, the bloom ﬁlter is completed
and ready for comparison. Each bigram can be hashed multiple
times, resulting in multiple positions in the bloom ﬁlter being set
to 1 for each bigram. This can be useful to reduce the effects of false
positives (which occur when two hash values map to the same
position in the bloom ﬁlter).
Bloom ﬁlters are a useful tool for determining set membership
efﬁciently. Bloom ﬁlters allow us to quickly determine whether a
bigram is not in the encoded bloom ﬁlter – we simply hash the bi-
gram and check whether the positions are set to 1. If they are set to
0 we can be certain the bigram is not contained in the bloom ﬁlter.
If the positions are set to 1, then the bigram is possibly contained
in the bloom ﬁlter – the other possibility is a false positive (a dif-
ferent bigram/combination of bigrams also resulting in the same
positions being set). The probability of a false positive depends
on the length of the bloom ﬁlter and the number of other elements
already contained within the bloom ﬁlter.
Two bloom ﬁlters can be compared to each other using the dice
coefﬁcient. This is calculated as twice the number of positions in
which both bloom ﬁlters have a value of one, divided by the num-
ber of positions set to 1 in total (see Fig. 4). The dice coefﬁcient re-
sults in a score between 0 and 1, where a higher score reﬂects
greater similarity.
Fig. 4. Example of calculating string similarity by comparing two bloom ﬁlters.
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bloom ﬁlters can be found in the original paper by Schnell et al.
[11].2.2. Evaluation of bloom ﬁlter methodology
2.2.1. Datasets
Two individual datasets were used in the evaluation; ten years
of West Australian Hospital Admissions data (approximately 7
million records) along with ten years of the New South Wales
Admitted Patient Data Collection (approximately 20 million re-
cords) were used in the evaluation. This data was made available
as part of the PHRN Proof of Concept 1 project [9]. Each dataset
had been previously internally linked (deduplicated) to a very high
quality (by the Western Australia linkage unit (WA-DLB [21]) and
the New South Wales linkage unit (CHeReL [22]), respectively)
using probabilistic linkage methods along with rigorous manual
reviews of created links, and a quality assurance program to
analyse and review likely errors. These linked datasets have been
use in a large number of research projects and published research
articles which further validate the quality of the matching. A
summary description of the datasets is provided in Table 1.2.2.2. Evaluation strategy
For each dataset an internal linkage was conducted using this
privacy preserving methodology. This linkage strategy deduplicat-
ed each ﬁle, identifying all the records belonging to an individual
within each datasets. In addition, an internal/deduplicating linkage
of each dataset was performed using a probabilistic matching
strategy [9], with the full unencrypted personal identiﬁers. In all
cases, the results of these linkages were compared with the results
achieved previously by the West Australian and New South Wales
linkage units, which were supplied to the CDL and used as a gold
standard. A variation to Schnell’s bloom ﬁlter methodology using
trigrams instead of bigrams was also tested.
A direct comparison between Schnell’s method and the one
extrapolated in this paper would be desirable but is essentially
not possible. Schnell does not present a method to link records to-
gether (although it is clear he sees this as the main use for his
string comparison methodology) but rather a method to compare
alphabetic strings. Additional information regarding how to com-
bine multiple comparison scores together, how to handle missing
values, or how to compare non-string variables is required to
compare records. This paper essentially adopts Schnell’s method
for comparing strings, placing it within a probabilistic linkage
framework.2.2.3. Linkage strategy
For the unencrypted linkage, a probabilistic linkage approach
[3,23] was used. The linkage strategy was based on a published
linkage strategy used to evaluate matching quality across a num-
ber of linkage products [24]. This strategy used two blocks (Soun-
dex of surname with ﬁrst initial, and date of birth). All possible
comparison variables were compared in each block. String similar-
ity measures were used for all alphabetic variables (names, address
and suburb) with exact matches being carried out on all other vari-
ables. Day, month and year of birth were all compared separately.
Correct agreement and disagreement weights were calculated for
each variable and used in linkage. The linkage quality at various
threshold settings was measured, with the highest result reported.
The encrypted linkage also followed this strategy, with the
same blocking ﬁelds, comparisons and agreement and disagree-
ment weights used. During the creation of the encrypted ﬁle, sep-
arate ﬁelds for Soundex and ﬁrst initial were created to allow
blocking on these ﬁelds during encrypted linkage. The bloom ﬁlter
string similarity comparison was used for names, address and sub-
urb ﬁelds, while an exact comparator was used for all other ﬁelds.2.2.4. Creation of encrypted dataset
Bloom ﬁlters were created and compared based on the
implementation described by Schnell et al. [11] with some
modiﬁcations.
Within each dataset, bloom ﬁlters were created for individual
ﬁelds. The bloom ﬁlters created were smaller in size than those
originally used by Schnell (from a length of 1000 to a length of
100). This dramatically reduced ﬁle sizes. Fields were split into
bigrams in line with the method outline Schnell et al. [11]. Padding
was used for each ﬁeld. The number of hash functions for each bi-
gram used was 3; this kept the same ratio of hash functions to
bloom ﬁlter length as described by Schnell et al. [11]. The dice coef-
ﬁcient was used to compare bloom ﬁlters. Work by Durham et al.
[17] had shown the use of bigrams and the dice coefﬁcient pro-
vided higher accuracy than other string similarity measures. Preli-
minary testing was carried out experimentally comparing Schnell’s
method for creating and comparing bloom ﬁlters (which used
1000 bit bloom ﬁlters with 30 hash functions per qgram) to our
own (which used 100 bit bloom ﬁlters with 3 hash functions per
qgram). This preliminary testing used the WA dataset described
above. The dataset was encrypted using both methods, and linked
using the same linkage strategy, with the results compared. No dif-
ference in linkage quality was found.
Blocking variables were used in the linkage strategy, dramati-
cally reducing the number of comparisons and allowing large scale
record linkage to occur (see Table 2). These were implemented as
simple hashes of the original values. Only variables agreeing on a
Table 1
Quality of datasets used in evaluation.
WA morbidity 6,772,949
records
Percentage of missing
values
Average string
length
NSW morbidity 19,874,083
records
Percentage of missing values
(%)
Average string
length
Given name <0.1% 6 Given name 31.9 4
Surname <0.1% 6 Surname 31.8 4
Sex 0 1 Sex <0.1 1
Date of birth 0 8 Date of birth <0.1 8
Address 0 18 Address 7.5 15
Suburb <0.1% 9 Suburb <1.0 9
Postcode 0 4 Postcode <1.0 4
State 0 1 State <0.1 1
Percentage of records with a missing value
WA morbidity <0.1% NSW morbidity 33.0
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did not have bloom ﬁlters computed, but were left blank. This al-
lowed the linkage program to recognise them as missing values
and treat them appropriately.
The bloom ﬁlter method for approximate string similarity al-
lows for several variations. Both bigrams and trigrams have been
used widely for (unencrypted) approximate string matching [25]
with trigrams recognised as performing well in privacy preserving
contexts [26]. Trigrams are more sensitive to differences between
strings than bigram methods [25]. The bloom ﬁlter method can
be easily adapted to use trigrams instead of bigrams, with no
apparent efﬁciency trade-offs. As well as utilising the bigram
bloom ﬁlter method used by Schnell and others [11,17], we also
tested the use of bloom ﬁlters using trigrams, using the same
datasets.
An alternate edit distance measure for bloom ﬁlter comparisons
has been developed, based on the Levenshtein distance function
[27]. This edit distance measure has several differences to the dice
coefﬁcient measure, both in terms of its calculation, as well as its
security properties. The edit distance measure requires a speciﬁc
method of creating the bloom ﬁlters, joining individual letters of
the string in question with their position in the string and hashing
these (i.e. ‘1S’, ‘2E’, ‘3A’, ‘4N’ for ‘SEAN’). The edit distance measure
also requires additional information to be known to the party car-
rying out the similarity calculation, such as the number of charac-
ters in the string. More importantly, the edit distance function
requires the party carrying out the similarity calculation to be
comparing a single bloom ﬁlter to a speciﬁc known word – it can-
not be used to compare two bloom ﬁlters containing unknown
strings. It also requires any password used to encrypt the data to
be known to the evaluating party. This has signiﬁcant privacy
implications.
The edit distance measure involves determining whether spe-
ciﬁc letter/number combinations are contained within the bloom
ﬁlter. This involves calculating hashes, a relatively slow operation.
Using the smaller WA data, a single comparison of two records will
require approximately 950 hashes to be calculated. Given there are
over 3.5 billion comparisons to be performed, this increases the
number of required hashes to 3.3 trillion. Using the standard
SHA-1 hash function used by Schnell et al. [11] we can calculate
approximately 700,000 hashes per second on our current hard-
ware. This equates to a run time of over 50 days to complete a link-
age of our smaller ﬁle. The edit distance measure, as currently
formulated, does not appear feasible for large scale record linkage
and cannot be used for third party privacy preserving linkage. For
these reasons, it was not experimentally evaluated in this study.2.2.5. Measuring linkage quality
Linkage quality was evaluated using pairwise precision, recall
and f-measure. These measures have been previously used in therecord linkage literature [24]. The f-measure of a linkage is the
harmonic mean between precision and recall. This provides a sin-
gle ﬁgure with which linkage quality can be compared. Final
thresholds were set to levels which maximised the f-measure.
3. Results
Linkage quality (precision, recall and f-measure) for encrypted
linkage using bigrams, and unencrypted linkages are presented in
Fig. 5. The threshold here refers to the lowest acceptable linkage
score used to determine results; probabilistic linkage gives each re-
cord pair combination a score based on their similarity, and it is up
to the operator to determine the appropriate threshold. There ap-
pears to be very little difference in linkage quality across the
threshold weight range except in the very high threshold values
in the WA data, where encrypted linkage outperformed unen-
crypted linkage. In all graphs, there appears to be a reasonably
wide range (from threshold value 14 to 18) where matching
achieved near optimum linkage quality. This should make it easier
for operators to extract high quality from their linkage. It is notable
that, for all the linkages, the optimal threshold settings did not ap-
pear to vary highly between encrypted and unencrypted data,
potentially hinting at methods of determining threshold settings
in privacy preserving record linkage.
Quality results using the optimal matching thresholds for each
linkage are presented in Table 3. The linkage quality was very high
for all linkages. There was very little difference is linkage quality
between the bigram and trigram encrypted linkages. Almost no
difference in quality was found between the encrypted linkage
using bloom ﬁlters and the unencrypted linkage using full personal
identiﬁers.
Irrespective of linkage type, results for NSW data were slightly
lower than those for WA. This was due to lower data quality – the
NSW ﬁle was missing all name information for one third of records
(see Table 1).
4. Discussion
This is the ﬁrst time that privacy preserving linkage using the
bloom ﬁlter method for approximate string comparison has been
applied to large, population-level data collections. The results
show that in terms of linkage quality, probabilistic linkage using
encrypted ﬁelds is equally as effective as probabilistic linkage
using unencrypted personal identiﬁers. In our experimental set-
ting, the results demonstrate that it is possible to link large vol-
umes of data and achieve high quality linkage without the need
to disclose fully identifying personal information. However, there
are some limited issues which may need to be overcome.
One drawback of using privacy preserving linkage is the difﬁ-
culty of checking the overall quality of the linkage. The typical
Table 2
Efﬁciency of linkage with blocking.
WA dataset NSW data
Blockinga No blocking Blockinga No blocking
Number of comparisons 3,506,013,239 22,936,415,691,826 16,226,633,871 197,489,577,608,403
Speed of record pair comparisonsb (comparisons per second) 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000
Approximate time required for linkage 8 h 6 years 37.5 h 52 years
a Using the speciﬁc blocking variables of soundex of surname with ﬁrst initial, as well as date of birth.
b A single record pair comparison involved the comparison of ﬁve bloom ﬁlters using the dice coefﬁcient as well as with ﬁve exact comparisons, along with the pooling of
these results into a ﬁnal score.
Fig. 5. Precision, recall and f-measure (linkage quality) for all possible threshold settings for each linkage undertaken. For almost any threshold setting, there is little
difference in linkage quality between encrypted and unencrypted linkage.
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inspection of individual pairs of records which have been brought
together. As all records in the privacy preserving linkage are en-
crypted, this is no longer possible. If a linkage was conducted that
was of poor quality, this poor quality linked clinical data would be
passed to the researcher. Depending on the errors, these may be
immediately noticeable by the researcher, or may be completely
undetectable, leading to erroneous research ﬁndings.Manual inspection of individual pairs is also used to determine
optimal threshold settings. There is currently no obvious way to
determine optimal thresholds with probabilistic encrypted linkage.
Additional work in this area will need to be undertaken in order to
make this method useful in practice. Based on Fig. 5, the optimal
threshold for an encrypted linkage appears to be very similar to
that of unencrypted linkage, which both have a reasonably wide
tolerance (a threshold setting 1 or 2 points either side will give
Table 3
Linkage quality of internal links of two datasets using privacy preserving bloom ﬁlters
compared with unencrypted probabilistic linkage.
Precision Recall f-Measure
WA unencrypted linkage 0.999 0.981 0.990
WA encrypted linkage: bigrams 0.998 0.981 0.990
WA encrypted linkage: trigrams 0.998 0.980 0.989
NSW unencrypted linkage 0.986 0.972 0.979
NSW encrypted linkage: bigrams 0.985 0.970 0.978
NSW encrypted linkage: trigrams 0.985 0.970 0.977
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digm using bloom ﬁlters may also avoid this problem, as this meth-
od does not involve setting a matching threshold. Deterministic
linkage uses a set of rules to speciﬁcally outline which combina-
tions of matching variables will result in a record-pair match
[13,28]. The ‘matching threshold’ for deterministic linkage is the
decision of which rules, out of all possible rules, will designate a
correct match.
In addition to manual inspection for quality assessment pur-
poses or threshold setting/checking, some linkage units have
adopted a clerical review and intervention process as an overall
quality improvement strategy, where a small proportion of links
are routinely scanned and manually reviewed [5,22,29]. While this
method results in a high quality linkage, there are drawbacks; it is
very expensive and time consuming, and may not be feasible for
large linkage projects. Data custodians may also feel uncomfort-
able about the increased privacy risk when business processes re-
quire personal identiﬁers to be regularly manually examined.
Clerical review processes are not used by all linkage units, how-
ever; and there is little published evidence of the extent of quality
improvement provided by clerical review, or whether this
improvement has any effects research outcomes. Some part of
the difference in quality between the results found here and the re-
sults found by the two linkage units (i.e. the reason why the f-mea-
sures found were 0.99 and 0.97 instead of 1) is due to clerical
review (the other difference may be due to better probabilistic
linkage strategies, access and linkage to additional data or more
importantly the access to additional variables used in these link-
ages). This clerical review process is not possible using privacy pre-
serving linkage techniques.
Notwithstanding these issues, privacy preserving linkage shows
promise as an alternative to linkage with personally identifying
information. Our adoption of a probabilistic linkage framework
which utilised bloom ﬁlters to encode and compare data allowed
large scale privacy preserving linkage to occur while providing
high linkage quality. Privacy and security are both increased, while
the optimum linkage quality achievable is comparable. No mem-
bers of the linkage unit are able to see any of the personal identi-
ﬁers used in linkage, but are able to link it to a very high quality.
Further testing of this approach on other datasets may be useful
to ensure its robustness. Additional variations to the protocol may
provide greater quality. It may be useful, also, to compare the
bloom ﬁlter privacy preserving approach with other privacy pre-
serving methods, such as BioGrid’s GRHANITE [16]. Based on these
results it appears entirely feasible to carry out a large scale linkage
study using this method for linkage. When methods for determin-
ing appropriate thresholds for privacy preserving linkage have
been developed and veriﬁed, it is envisaged this methodology, or
similar methodologies could replace traditional record linkage.
5. Conclusion
This study has shown the feasibility of privacy preserving
record linkage of large scale datasets. By using the bloom ﬁltermethod to encrypt and compare individual ﬁelds, along with a
probabilistic linkage framework, large scale privacy preserving
linkage can occur at no cost to linkage quality. More work is cur-
rently needed to determine appropriate methods for threshold
setting.
Although more work is required to reﬁne the process for routine
record linkage, it is hoped that adaptations of this method or sim-
ilar privacy preserving approach will serve to reduce the privacy
risks related to record linkage and therefore increase the use of re-
cord linkage to support health research. Through these efforts, we
will be able to use administrative health data resources to their
full extent to improve health services without compromising on
individual privacy.Acknowledgments
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